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A Judge’s Personal Sentencing 
Journey Told Through the Voices of 
Offenders He Sentenced 
Mark W. Bennett* 
Abstract 
Federal sentencing is a tragic mess. Thirty years of 
conflicting legislative experiments began with high hopes but 
resulted in mass incarceration. Federal sentences, especially in 
drug cases, are all too often bone-crushingly severe.  
  In this Article, the Honorable Mark Bennett, a retired federal 
judge, shares about his journey with federal sentencing and his 
strong disagreement with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines by 
telling the stories of some of the 400 men and women he sentenced 
during his twenty-five years as a federal judge.  
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Federal sentencing is a tragic mess. Thirty years of 
conflicting legislative experiments began with high hopes but 
resulted in mass incarceration.1 Federal sentences, especially in 
drug cases, are all too often bone-crushingly severe. That is 
especially true for most of the endless drug offenders I see:  
non-violent, low-level, long-term and severe drug addicts. These 
folks stand before me for sentencing in sharp contrast to the 
super violent drug cartel kingpins we read about and see on 
television, Netflix, and in the movies.2 
This Article reveals much of my journey through the arc of 
federal sentencing. The reveal comes from the voices of the men 
and women I have sentenced and the over four hundred I have 
visited in federal prisons while I was a sitting federal district 
judge for nearly a quarter century.3 I retired on March 2, 2019. 
 
 1. Paul Hofer, After Ten Years of Advisory Guidelines, and Thirty Years 
of Mandatory Minimums, Federal Sentencing Still Needs Reform, 47 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 649, 649 (2016). 
 2. Mark W. Bennett, Addicted to Incarceration:  A Federal Judge 
Reveals Shocking Truths About Federal Sentencing and Fleeting Hopes for 
Reform, 87 UMKC L. REV. 3, 3 (2018) [hereinafter Bennett, Addicted to 
Incarceration]. 
 3. I first wrote about visiting offenders I had sentenced in 2011. See 
Mark W. Bennett, Reflections on Visiting Federal Inmates, 94 JUDICATURE 304, 
304–05 (2011) (reflecting on seven years of visiting inmates). 
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Most of the names of the offenders in this Article are obscure 
and little-known except by their families. Conversely, a few are 
very well known for the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence their 
cases generated. Many law review4 and other articles and media 
reports5 have documented my opposition to the War on Drugs 
 
 4. See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, A Judge’s Attempt at Sentencing 
INCONSISTENCY After Booker:  Judge (Ret.) Mark W. Bennett’s Guidelines 
for Sentencing, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 243, 256–65 (2019) (explaining how federal 
judges engage in district court activism to achieve criminal justice reform); 
Bennett, Addicted to Incarceration, supra note 2, at 15–17, 20–22 (discussing 
the current sentencing scheme prior to the First Step Act and several proposed 
reforms); Mark W. Bennett & Victoria C. Plaut, Looking Criminal and the 
Presumption of Dangerousness: Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone, and 
Criminal Justice, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745, 754, 780 (2018) (analyzing the 
history and effects of Afrocentric facial feature bias in the criminal justice 
system); Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging 
Implicit Bias:  A National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. 
REV. 63, 106 (2017) (finding that both federal and state court trial judges have 
greater anti-Jewish and anti-Asian implicit biases than members of the 
general public and that the implicit biases affect the length of the sentence in 
a white-collar sentencing scenario); Mark W. Bennett, Justin D. Levinson & 
Koichi Hioki, Judging Federal White-Collar Fraud Sentencing:  An Empirical 
Study Revealing the Need for Further Reform, 102 IOWA L. REV. 939, 981 (2017) 
(criticizing the fraud Guideline on numerous grounds); Mark W. Bennett, The 
Implicit Racial Bias in Sentencing:  The Next Frontier, 126 YALE L.J. F. 391, 
392 (2017) (asserting that Afrocentric facial feature and skin tone biases are 
the next frontier of racially biased sentencing); Mark W. Bennett, A Slow 
Motion Lynching? The War on Drugs, Mass Incarceration, Doing Kimbrough 
Justice, and a Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 873, 
877 (2014) (discussing mass incarceration and the need for more federal judges 
to express “policy” disagreements with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and 
urging Congress towards sentencing reform); Mark Osler & Mark W. Bennett, 
A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass Incarceration and the Role of 
Discretion, 7 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 117, 121, 129, 137, 153, 163 (2014) 
(discussing the rise of mass incarceration and the role of Congress, the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, and federal judges in it and a path for reform); Mark 
W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases 
in Federal Sentencing:  A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 
104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495–96, 529 (2014) (explaining the 
powerful cognitive “anchoring” effect of the federal sentencing guidelines 
which leads to overly harsh sentences and suggesting a modest, simple, and 
practical reform to reduce the anchoring effect). 
 5. See, e.g., Mark Bennett & Mark Osler, The Wrong People Decide Who 
Goes to Prison, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/12/03/opinion/bennett-osler-
sentencing/index.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2013, 7:49 AM) (last visited Mar. 
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and my criticism of the bone-crushing severity of federal 
sentencing, congressionally mandated mandatory minimums, 
and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s federal sentencing 
guidelines. Jessica Roth recently described my decision to speak 
out about the unfairness of federal sentencing: 
[S]ince at least 2012, Judge Bennett has written extensively 
about the need to reform sentencing policy in a variety of 
publications and has granted numerous interviews to 
journalists. Acknowledging that “[f]ederal judges have a 
longstanding culture of not speaking out on issues of public 
concern,” he explained that he was “breaking with this 
tradition” because the “daily grist” of unjust mandatory 
minimum sentencing for non-violent drug offenders “compels 
[him] to.”6 
 
28, 2020) (“[O]ur analysis of the way these enhancements have been used 
reveals a deeply disturbing dirty little secret of federal sentencing: the 
stunningly arbitrary application of these enhancements by prosecutors within 
the Department of Justice.”) [https://perma.cc/YQL3-67FX]; Mark W. Bennett, 
How Mandatory Minimums Forced Me to Send More Than 1,000 Nonviolent 
Drug Offenders to Federal Prison, NATION (Oct. 24, 2012), https://
www.thenation.com/article/how-mandatory-minimums-forced-me-send-more-
1000-nonviolent-drug-offenders-federal-pri (last visited Mar. 28, 2020) (“If 
lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug addicts actually 
worked, one might be able to rationalize them. But there is no evidence that 
they do.”) [https://perma.cc/JHK8-GMDW]; THE HOUSE I LIVE IN (BBC 2012) 
(directing by Eugene Jarecki, the film was the Official Selection and Winner 
of the Grand Jury Prize at Sundance Film Festival 2012); Eli Saslow, Against 
His Better Judgment, WASH. POST, June 6, 2015, at A1 (“Bennett had often 
viewed his job as less about presiding than abiding by dozens of mandatory 
minimum sentences established by Congress in the late 1980s for federal 
offenses.”). 
 6. Jessica A. Roth, The “New” District Court Activism in Criminal 
Justice Reform, 72 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 190 (2018). Professor Roth 
uses the term “new” activism hesitantly because she recognizes the term 
“activism” has “become little more than an epithet for describing judges and 
decisions with which the speaker disagrees.” Id. at 190 (footnote omitted). She 
uses the term for two reasons. First, it describes “an active and engaged 
judicial posture rather than a passive, reactive one.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
“Second, it taps into important debates about the proper role of the judge in 
our democracy, debates that have not fully explored the hortatory and other 
forms of judicial activity described in this Article.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Many of my judicial decisions have reflected my strong 
disagreement with many of the deeply flawed U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.7 
 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Nawanna, 321 F. Supp. 3d 943, 952 (N.D. 
Iowa 2018) (disagreeing with the methamphetamine Guidelines on policy 
grounds because they are based on a flawed assumption that 
methamphetamine purity is a proxy for role in the offense); United States v. 
Feauto, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1040 (N.D. Iowa 2015) (concluding that a 
direction to disregard or nullify a statutory mandatory minimum sentence 
when resentencing a defendant, pursuant to Amendment 782 and policy 
statement U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c), exceeds the Sentencing Commission’s 
statutory authority and/or violates the non-delegation doctrine and the 
separation-of-powers principle), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. In other 
words, the authority to nullify mandatory minimums is not a power that the 
Sentencing Commission could usurp or one that Congress could delegate). Id. 
United States v. Koons, 850 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 1783 
(2018); United States v. Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1023 (N.D. Iowa 2013) 
(stating a policy disagreement with the methamphetamine quantity 
Guidelines, which systemically overstate defendants’ culpability); United 
States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (disagreeing 
with the Career Offender Guideline when applied to a defendant, like 
Newhouse, who is a nonviolent, recidivist drug addict occupying a low-level 
role in the drug trade in order to obtain drugs for her addiction, but 
recognizing that some offenders have earned Career Offender status and 
should be sentenced within the Career Offender Guideline, and, in rare 
instances, higher); United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 880 (N.D. 
Iowa 2011) (rejecting the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines using the “new” 18:1 
ratio, for the same reasons as the “old” 100:1 ratio and based on additional 
concerns that they create a “double whammy” on crack defendants, penalizing 
them once for the assumed presence of aggravating circumstances in crack 
cocaine cases and again for the actual presence of such aggravating 
circumstances in a particular case); United States v. Vandebrake, 771 F. Supp. 
2d 961, 1011 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (varying upward from the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines based on policy disagreements with the relatively lenient 
treatment of antitrust violations when compared to fraud sentences), aff’d, 679 
F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Golden, 679 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 
(N.D. Iowa) (reiterating rejection of the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio in 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, note 10, categorically, on policy grounds), aff’d, 394 F. App’x 
347 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jacob, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1112 (N.D. 
Iowa 2009) (reiterating categorical rejection, on policy grounds, of U.S.S.G. 
§ 2G2.2, concerning sexual exploitation of a minor in the form of interstate 
transportation of child pornography because it improperly skews sentences 
upward); United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640–41 (N.D. Iowa 2009) 
(rejecting the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio in the guidelines on policy grounds); 
United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (N.D. Iowa 2009) 
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I am a retired U.S. district judge who spent more than one 
third of my life populating the Federal Bureau of Prisons. I 
sentenced more than 4,000 offenders spanning twenty-four 
years on the bench. I did this in five different districts—from 
both districts in Iowa to the near farthest reaches of our federal 
courts in the District of the Northern Mariana Islands. I 
imposed sentences from probation (not often enough) to 
affirming two juries’ verdicts to impose the federal death 
penalty.8 I also reviewed numerous state and federal sentences 
as a district judge on habeas review. Finally, I sat by 
designation numerous times on the courts of appeals, where I 
reviewed federal sentences on direct appeal and federal and 
state sentences on habeas review. Before that, I was in private 
practice for seventeen years as a civil rights, civil liberties, and 
criminal defense lawyer, almost exclusively in our federal 
courts. Up to the day I retired as a federal judge, I was 
passionate about judging and loved most of it. I even thought I 
was at my very best in sentencing, but I have not missed it for 
a second—except for the judges I was so exceptionally fortunate 
to have as colleagues and the folks I worked with at the 
courthouses in our district, especially our incredibly dedicated 
U.S. probation officers. 
I found the collective weight of so many sentencings more 
emotionally draining and soul robbing than the deaths of my 
son, all my siblings, and my parents. My decision to retire freed 
me from being a cog in the nations’ machinery of injustice—
driven primarily by nonsensical and politically motivated 
congressionally mandatory minimum sentences and 
extraordinarily harsh federal sentencing guidelines. One of my 
friends commented to me recently that he had not seen me so 
 
(rejecting categorically, on policy grounds, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for 
child pornography cases). 
 8. See United States v. Honken, 381 F. Supp. 2d 936, 1056 (N.D. Iowa 
2005) (“The simply horrific nature of the murders, and the presence of very 
strong aggravating factors and relatively weak mitigating factors, resulted in 
the imposition of the death penalty for the murders of the two children.”); 
United States v. Johnson, 239 F. Supp. 2d 924, 927 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (noting 
that Johnson was sentenced to death for her involvement in the murder of five 
witnesses to the drug-trafficking enterprise of Johnson’s boyfriend, Honken). 
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happy since my days of practicing law. I am not asking for 
sympathy, just understanding. Nobody forced me to take what 
is considered one of finest legal jobs in the country, a job that 
outsiders will mark as the pinnacle of the arc of my legal career. 
This Article follows my presentation at the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 2019 Annual 
Symposium: Issues in Federal Sentencing: Privilege, Disparity, 
and a Way Forward. I know something of privilege—White 
privilege—I have been the beneficiary of it all of my life. I grew 
up in an upper-middle-class family in a White neighborhood in 
St. Paul, Minnesota, with few wants. My elementary and junior 
high school were one hundred percent White. Yet, my parents 
were strong civil rights proponents and taught me that everyone 
on life’s journey was a son or daughter of a higher being and 
entitled to be treated with dignity and respect. They fought 
innumerable battles for my younger brother, David, who was 
born with severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy. I saw 
warriors for justice first-hand. I lived with them and loved them 
deeply. They have long since passed but they remain my role 
models and heroes. The title of the panel I was on for the 2019 
Annual Symposium included the phrase “Dignity in the 
Courtroom.” That was my highest aspiration—not always 
obtained—that offenders be treated with unparalleled dignity. 
My steady stream of amazing law clerks often commented to me 
in private that I was so tough on the lawyers but so passionate 
and kind to the offenders. 
From a macro lens, in addition to the severity of federal 
sentencing, the racial disparity in federal sentencing is also 
deeply troubling. A recent finding by the United States 
Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), utilizing sophisticated 
multivariate regression analysis, found that “Black male 
offenders continued to receive longer sentences than similarly 
situated White male offenders.”9 The Commission found that 
 
 9. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN 
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“Black male offenders received sentences on average 19.1 
percent longer than similarly situated White male offenders” 
during fiscal years 2012 to 2016.10 Male Hispanic offenders 
received sentences that were 5.3 percent longer than White 
male offenders during fiscal years 2012 to 2016.11 
The vignettes you are about to read are both real and 
fictional. Real in the sense that everything you read actually 
happened. Fictional in the sense that some of the names, places, 
and voices are composites of real events in my nearly quarter 
century of federal sentencing. 
II. The Voices of Offenders I Have Sentenced 
A. Anthony Jones 
I only met Judge Bennett once back in the early 2000s when 
I was serving a lengthy federal sentence for crack cocaine 
distribution in the Kansas City area. I was imprisoned at the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons facility, Terminal Island, in Long 
Beach, California. Yeah, what a terrible name for a prison. It 
was a routine day just like every other one and early in the 
afternoon I got asked by the warden’s office if I was willing to 
meet with a fellow who was touring the prison and wanted to 
talk to a few inmates about life inside this joint. The warden’s 
office said no staff would be present because the guy wanted our 
straight scoop. I agreed and was taken to a small room where 
two other inmates from different cell blocks were seated. I 
recognized both, a Hispanic gang-banger from East L.A. with 
prison tats over his entire body and face. I didn’t know his real 
name, but his prison gang name was “El Salivotas” (the Drooler) 
because part of his face was paralyzed in a prison knife fight. 
The other guy was an Anglo meth dealer who goes by “L.A. Ice.” 
I was the only Black con in the room. The door opened suddenly, 
and this middle-aged, casually dressed Anglo walked in and 
smiled and held out his hand to each of us to shake our hands 
and said simply, “My name is Mark, and I am here to ask about 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 8. 
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your experiences with the federal criminal justice system and 
your incarceration here at Terminal Island. May I sit down in 
the empty chair? What are your names?” After we gave him our 
names, he called each of us by our first name and asked that we 
use his first name “Mark.” Then he said: 
To make full disclosure, my name is Mark Bennett, and I am 
a U.S. district judge from the Northern District of Iowa. I am 
here for the sole purpose of asking each of you if you are 
willing to help me become a better judge by sharing your 
criminal justice and personal stories with me. 
The next 90 minutes were gone in a flash. Judge Bennett 
asked question after question about our lives growing up; any 
role models in the community; early criminal activity; how we 
got caught on our latest federal crime; what we thought of the 
legal process, our defense lawyers, the prosecutors, the U.S. 
probation officers, the sentencing judge, the length of our 
sentences, safety and programming in Terminal Island; and our 
hopes for the future. When Judge Bennett said it was time to 
wrap up and for him to leave, I started sobbing, uncontrollably. 
Judge Bennett placed his hand on my knee and asked in a soft 
voice, “Tony, did I say something to upset you?” After I caught 
my breath I was able to mumble, “No, it’s just in my wildest 
dreams I never thought I would be in a small room with a federal 
judge and that he would ask my opinions about things.” 
 
 
As I left Terminal Island, my mind was swimming with 
information from the inmates. That last contact with Tony and 
his sobbing left an indelible impression on me and was mostly 
what I was thinking about as I traveled back to Iowa the next 
day. It was on that plane ride home that I decided visiting 
offenders that I had sentenced would be an important piece of 
gleaning a deeper understanding of the federal criminal justice 
system. It was not until many years later, when I watched a 
YouTube video by Bryan Stevenson, founder and executive 
director of the Equal Justice Initiative, titled “The Power of 
Proximity,” that I began to fully appreciate how and what the 
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offenders taught me.12 It was by being proximate with offenders 
I had sentenced, in their environments, not mine, where my real 
education took place. 
B. David Johnson and Thirty or So Other Offenders at the 
Federal Prison in Yankton, South Dakota 
The federal prison camp in Yankton, South Dakota, was a 
federal prison I liked to recommend to the Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) for non-violent offenders serving a sentence of less than 
120 months (requirements for admission). Not only was it the 
closest federal prison to Iowa, but it had one of the largest 
500-hour residential drug treatment programs in the BOP. All 
of the offenders going through the drug treatment program lived 
in the same cellblock for the length of the program.  
My first visit there was shortly after my visit to Terminal 
Island. I communicated with the warden to set up the visit. I 
had read about the prison in Yankton and knew it was on the 
site of a former private college that had gone bankrupt and, 
ironically, whose president had gone to federal prison for fraud. 
It was located in a very nice residential part of Yankton and 
looked like dozens of other private colleges in small Midwestern 
cities.  
I saw lots of folks walking on campus, no perimeter fences 
or guard towers like at Terminal Island. It was not until I drove 
up to the entrance that I could see all the male inmates wore 
brown, drab, identical prison clothing. While I was walking to 
the building in which I had been told the warden’s office was, an 
 
 12. See Fortune Magazine, The Power of Proximity: CEO Initiative 2018, 
YOUTUBE (June 28, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RyAwZIHo4Y 
(encouraging listeners to “get ‘proximate’ to suffering and understand the 
nuanced experiences of those who suffer from and experience inequality”) 
[https://perma.cc/8CE6-LVFU]. Stevenson believes that “if you are willing to 
get closer to people who are suffering, you will find the power to change the 
world.” Leandra Fernandez, Empathy and Social Justice:  The Power of 
Proximity in Improvement Science, CARNEGIE FOUND. ADVANCEMENT TEACHING 
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.carnegiefoundation.org/blog/empathy-and-social-
justice-the-power-of-proximity-in-improvement-science/ (last visited Mar. 28, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/V377-UQS7]. 
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old main type building, I was greeted by several inmates I 
recognized, and we exchanged smiles. After a tour of the prison, 
the warden took me to the drug treatment dorm, where I would 
meet with inmates I had sentenced who were in the residential 
drug treatment program. There were over thirty offenders in the 
room when I entered. I had no prepared remarks, and I was 
nervous not knowing what kind of reception I would receive. I 
pride myself in getting anyone, including strangers, to engage 
in conversation, but this was different, way different.  
As I stood in the front of the room, I could not get any kind 
of response from the offenders. So I asked point blank:  “Why is 
nobody speaking?” No one initially responded. Then an offender 
I recognized, because I had recently sentenced him, David 
Johnson, raised his hand and said:  “Judge, ain’t you here to 
raise our sentences? I got a lower sentence than I expected and 
even lower than my worthless defense lawyer asked you for.”   
That caught me off-guard because I had not anticipated it. 
I assured the offenders, “I can neither raise nor lower your 
sentences, and I am here to visit with you and find out how each 
one of you is doing.” Once that was out of the way, the offenders 
were incredibly curious and talkative. Curious as to why I was 
there to meet with them and anxious to ask questions from 
everything about my expectations for them on supervised 
release (the relatively new name for what replaced parole) to 
advice on parenting, job prospects when they are released, and 
which programs to take at the prison.  
I had many further visits to Yankton to meet with inmates 
I had sentenced. We had far ranging discussions—less about 
their cases and more about prison programs and the 
expectations I, our probation officers, and other judges in our 
district had for them and what is expected on supervised release 
when they got out. I always mentioned that I was a parent and 
how fulfilling that was for me. That generated most of my 
discussion with the offenders about who to reconnect with— 
family and especially children. Sadly, for between eight and ten 
percent of the offenders visited in federal prisons, I was their 
only visitor. 
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C. Steven Spears 
I am Steve Spears, and I was sentenced by Judge Bennett in 
2005 for possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine. Judge 
Bennett announced in my sentencing that he disagreed with the 
U.S. Sentencing Guideline that treated one gram of crack as 
equal to one hundred grams of powder cocaine. Under this 100:1 
ratio, the U.S. Probation Office determined my original 
guideline sentencing range was 324 to 405 months. Judge 
Bennett rejected the 100:1 ratio and adopted a 20:1 ratio. Judge 
Bennett indicated that this reduced my guideline range to 210 to 
262 months. Because I also had a twenty-year mandatory 
minimum sentence, Judge Bennett sentenced me to the minimum 
he could:  240 months. It then gets complicated. This is what I 
came to understand by reading the various court decisions that 
followed and what was explained to me by my new lawyers. My 
original lawyer didn’t even ask the judge to reduce my sentence 
based on the 100:1 disparity; Judge Bennett did that on his own. 
The Eighth Circuit, en banc, reversed Judge Bennett and 
remanded my case for resentencing, holding that there was no 
authority authorizing district courts to reject the 100:1 ratio and 
use a different ratio in sentencing defendants for crack cocaine 
offenses.”13 My new lawyers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court 
and it reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded it back to 
them.14 The Eighth Circuit again, en banc, reversed Judge 
Bennett and remanded it back to him to resentence me to the 
higher guideline range of 324 to 405.15 I appealed again to the 
 
 13. See United States v. Spears (Spears I), 469 F.3d 1166, 1173–74 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“The district court stated its sentencing decision was 
based solely on the Perry rationale and the other § 3553(a) factors would be 
considered only if the sentence was reversed on the 20:1 ratio.”). 
 14. See Spears v. United States, 552 U.S. 1090, 1090 (2008) (vacating and 
remanding in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), which 
held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act did not require a 100:1 ratio application 
during sentencing). 
 15. See Spears v. United States (Spears II), 533 F.3d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (“In Spears’s case, we did not need either to adopt or endorse 
the proposition outlined in Gunter and now Kimbrough because the district 
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U.S. Supreme Court, and they reversed the Eighth Circuit yet 
again and confirmed that Judge Bennett had the right to 
disagree with the 100:1 ratio and substitute a 20:1 ratio.16 The 
Supreme Court flatly rejected the Eight Circuit approach that 
sentencing judges did not have the right to categorically reject 
the 100:1 ratio and substitute their own ratio.17 Now I get to 
quote from a Supreme Court case that bears my name, Steven 
Spears:  “A sentencing judge who is given the power to reject the 
disparity created by the crack-to-powder ratio must also possess 
the power to apply a different ration which, in his judgment, 
corrects the disparity.”18 This reduced my sentence from the 324 
to 405 months that the Eighth Circuit thought I deserved to the 
240-month mandatory minimum that Judge Bennett gave me, a 
reduction of more than ten years. Judge Bennett indicated at the 
end of the sentencing that he would have gone lower had 
Congress not handcuffed his discretion with this mandatory 
minimum twenty-year sentence. 
 
 
Shortly after the Spears Supreme Court decision, I reduced 
the crack/powder ratio that I used in sentencing crack cocaine 
offenders from the 20:1 ratio to a 1:1 ratio.19 The Spears case 
also reflected something I found deeply troubling as a federal 
judge with a very heavy criminal caseload. I was often shocked 
by the lack of quality representation by defense lawyers. 
 
court did not just ‘consider the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment of 
crack and powder cocaine offenses.’”) (citation omitted). 
 16. See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009) (“[T]he 
District Court’s choice of replacement ratio was based upon two well-reasoned 
decisions by other courts, which themselves reflected the Sentencing 
Commission’s expert judgment that a 20:1 ratio would be appropriate in a 
mine-run case.”). 
 17. See id. at 265–66 (“[W]e now clarify that district courts are entitled 
to reject and vary categorically from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a 
policy disagreement with those Guidelines.”). 
 18. Id. at 265. 
 19. See United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (N.D. Iowa 2009) 
(reporting my first decision adopting the 1:1 crack/powder sentencing ratio 
and rejecting the 100:1 ratio on policy grounds). 
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Because we were dealing with a person’s liberty, I would often 
raise legal issues, including mitigating factors that the defense 
failed to raise. I would give the parties an opportunity to discuss 
them and grant a continuance if either lawyer wanted one. Way 
too often I gave a sentence that was less than the defense lawyer 
asked for. I was surprised to find so many walking violations of 
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.20 On the other 
hand, there were several truly amazing defense lawyers, 
including some from the Federal Public Defender’s Office. I tried 
as best I could to give what I thought was just sentence 
regardless of the quality of counsel. The federal prosecutors who 
came before me were very talented and exceptionally honest and 
strait forward. We tangled often on legal issues and what a fair 
sentence would be, but they were also often helpful in pointing 
out how aggravating factors affected mitigation factors in the 
difficult balancing act that is federal sentencing. 
D. Demetrius Gully 
I pled guilty without a plea agreement to four counts of 
distributing crack cocaine arising from controlled buys. Using 
the 100:1 federal sentencing advisory guideline range in effect at 
the time of my sentencing, my guideline range was 108 to 135 
months. If Judge Bennett could be persuaded to use a 1:1 
crack/powder ratio, my guideline range would drop to 30 to 37 
months.21 The judge went farther than my defense lawyer argued 
for and, on his own, decided to adopt a 1:1 crack/power ratio.22 
I thought that was awesome news till the judge finished with his 
analysis of my sentencing. He started with the 1:1 crack/powder 
 
 20. See, e.g., Spears I, 469 F.3d at 1169 (noting that my sentence was at 
least a twenty-six percent decrease and at most a forty-one percent decrease 
from what the g0uidelines required, and which defendant’s counsel did not 
request). 
 21. See Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (describing the effects of 
aggravating and mitigating factors on the lowered—1:1—base offense level). 
 22. See id. at 640–45 (highlighting the policy issues with the 100:1 crack-
to-powder ratio and the role the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Kimbrough 
should have in untying the hands of federal judges at sentencing). 
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ratio but then increased my sentence under what he referred to 
as “the 3553(a) factors.” Bennett stated that my history of 
assaultive behavior, including towards women; my continued 
drug dealing while on pretrial release; that I was more than a 
“street dealer” of crack; my repeated criminal conduct; and the 
likelihood that I would reoffend justified a sentence of 84 




It made a lot of sense to me to use a 1:1 crack/powder ratio 
and then increase the sentence if other factors like violence and 
weapons were present. Data from the United States Sentencing 
Commission indicate that such factors are more often present in 
powder cases than crack cases.24 But, at bottom they are not 
present in a majority of the cases, so to use those factors to 
justify a 100:1 ratio is like using a sledgehammer where a 
scalpel will do.25 
E. Billy Williams 
I was told by my defense lawyer that as the first offender to 
be sentenced by Judge Bennett after the passage of the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”),26 he did not know if the judge 
 
 23. See id. at 646 (“[Given these aggravating factors,] a sentence of 84 
months of incarceration—more than twice the upper end of his alternative 
guideline range based on a 1:1 ratio—was sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary in this case.”). 
 24. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK 
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 117 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites
/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks
/2018/2018-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf (noting that aggravating 
factors caused an increase in 8.6% of powder cases and 5.9% of crack cases) 
[https://perma.cc/5F8J-QTRP]. 
 25. See id. (noting that aggravating factors played no role in adjusting 
federal sentences in 93% of all drug cases, 91.4% of powder cocaine cases, and 
94.1% of crack cases). 
 26. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 
2372–73 (reducing disparities in cocaine sentencing, eliminating mandatory 
minimums for simple possession, increasing penalties for major drug 
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would follow his prior 1:1 crack/powder ratio from the Gully 
decision or follow the congressional mandate of the FSA, which 
my lawyer told me reduced the 100:1 crack/powder ratio but 
only to 18:1. As you all might expect, I was really nervous at my 
sentencing. Judge Bennett said in my sentencing that he 
assumed when he heard about the passage of the FSA that he 
would be required to now use the 18:1 crack/powder ratio.27 He 
went on with a lengthy explanation, much of which I really did 
not understand, until I had the time to study his complex written 
decision that he was sticking to his guns on the 1:1 crack/powder 
ratio. My favorite part of Judge Bennett’s sentencing opinion in 
my case was his conclusion: 
Make no mistake:  I believe that the replacement of the 100:1 
crack-to-powder ratio of the 1986 Act and associated 
Sentencing Guidelines with the 18:1 crack-to-powder ratio of 
the 2010 FSA and the November 1, 2010, amendments to the 
Sentencing Guidelines was a huge improvement, in terms of 
fairness to crack defendants. While such incremental 
improvement is often the nature of political progress on 
difficult social justice issues—and, in this instance, the 
increment is perhaps unusually large—an incremental 
improvement is not enough to make me abdicate my duty to 
“[c]ritically evaluat[e] the crack/cocaine ratio in terms of its 
fealty to the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act.” See 
Whigham, 754 F.Supp.2d at 247, 2010 WL 4959882 at *7. 
 
 
traffickers, and emphasizing defendants’ role and behavior during commission 
of drug offenses). 
 27. In my sentencing opinion in Williams I wrote: 
When I first learned that the 2010 FSA was about to be passed, I 
just assumed that I would change my opinion from a 1:1 ratio to the 
new 18:1 ratio, because I assumed that Congress would have had 
persuasive evidence—or at least some empirical or other evidence—
before it as the basis to adopt that new ratio. I likewise assumed 
that the Sentencing Commission would have brought its 
institutional expertise and empirical evidence to bear, both in 
advising Congress and in adopting crack cocaine Sentencing 
Guidelines based on the 18:1 ratio. Failing that, I assumed that the 
prosecution would present at the presentencing hearing in this case 
some evidence supporting the 18:1 ratio.  
United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849–50 (N.D. Iowa 2011). 
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Performing that duty here, I must reject the Sentencing 
Guidelines using the “new” 18:1 ratio, just as I rejected the 
Sentencing Guidelines using the “old” 100:1 ratio, based on a 
policy disagreement with those guidelines, even in “mine-run” 
cases, such as this one. I must do so, because I find that the 
“new” 18:1 guidelines still suffer from most or all of the same 
injustices that plagued the 100:1 guidelines, including the 
failure of the Sentencing Commission to exercise its 
characteristic institutional role in developing the guidelines, 
the lack of support for most of the assumptions that crack 
cocaine involves greater harms than powder cocaine, the 
improper use of the quantity ratio as a “proxy” for the 
perceived greater harms of crack cocaine, and the disparate 
impact of the ratio on Black offenders. I also find that the 
“new” guidelines suffer from some additional concerns, in 
that they now create a “double whammy” on crack defendants, 
penalizing them once for the assumed presence of aggravating 
circumstances in crack cocaine cases and again for the actual 
presence of such aggravating circumstances in a particular 
case. 
In one respect the “new” 18:1 guideline ratio is more irrational 
and pernicious than the original 100:1. When the 100:1 ratio 
was enacted, Congress and the Sentencing Commission did 
not have access to the overwhelming scientific evidence that 
they now have. This overwhelming scientific evidence now 
demonstrates that the difference between crack and powder is 
like the difference between ice and water—or beer and wine. 
Can anyone imagine a sentence that is many times harsher 
for becoming legally intoxicated by drinking wine rather than 
beer? Of course not.28 
 
 
I really did expect that the FSA’s new 18:1 ratio would be 
based on empirical evidence that was not present or available 
when the original 100:1 ratio was adopted. But that clearly was 
not the case despite my efforts to give the United States an 
opportunity to establish the empirical basis for the 18:1 ratio. 
As I wrote in the Williams decision, the 18:1 ratio of the FSA 
 
 28. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 891–92. 
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was a disappointing political compromise.29 Not disappointing 
that it was a compromise, which I view as helpful in politics, but 
disappointing because of the total lack of empirical evidence 
that was readily available to Congress. Interestingly, after both 
the Gully30 and Williams31 decisions, the government never 
appealed any of my crack ratio sentences. 
F. Lori Ann Newhouse 
When I was sentenced in 2013 by Judge Bennett for 
possession of twenty grams of methamphetamine, the PSR 
(presentence report) classified me as a “Career Offender” under 
the federal sentencing guidelines.32 My lawyer explained to me 
that this raised my federal sentencing guideline range from 70 to 
87 months to what Judge Bennett described as “a staggering and 
mind-numbing 262–327 months.”33 The judge recognized that I 
was a “low-level pill smurfer,”34 that is someone who went to 
various stores to gather precursor chemicals for someone to cook 
meth.35 In my case, I was smurfing pseudoephedrine pills used 
in cough and cold remedy medications sold over-the-counter.36 
 
 29. See id. at 880 (“Not only was the 18:1 ratio . . . the product of political 
compromise, not an authoritative rationale, it continued the same flaws that 
were present in the 100:1 ratio in the 1986 Act.”). 
 30. See Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (adopting the 1:1 crack/powder 
sentencing ratio on an as-applied basis). 
 31. See Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 853 (maintaining a 1:1 ratio in spite 
of the unreasoned mandate of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to implement a 
18:1 ratio). 
 32. See United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (N.D. Iowa 
2013) (noting that defendants with at least two previous drug or violent crime 
convictions and sentences are statutorily classified as “career offenders” under 
§ 4B1.1 of the FSA). 
 33. Id. at 958. 
 34. Id. at 957. 
 35. See id. (citing Rob Bovett, Methamphetamine:  Casting a Shadow 
Across Disciplines and Jurisdictions, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1195, 1208 n.86 (2006)). 
 36. See id. at n.2 (“In order to obtain sufficient quantities of 
pseudoephedrine, methamphetamine manufacturers have increasingly 
turned to pill smurfers to make multiple purchases of products containing 
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The judge noted in his sentencing opinion that I “was just 
one of thousands of ‘low hanging fruit’—non-violent drug addicts 
captured by the War on Drugs and filling federal prisons far 
beyond their capacity.”37 The facts of my case were unusual. The 
judge called me a “one-day” Career Offender because the 
predicate crimes for me being a Career Offender occurred in 2002 
when I was twenty-two. I was in a motel room with three others 
when law enforcement found 3.29 grams of meth and 14.72 
grams of psilocybin magic mushrooms.38 I was sentenced to 
probation in state court for these two charges, by the same judge, 
but on different days.39 Judge Bennett noted something that I 
still find incredible: 
For reasons unknown, but likely random, the local prosecutor 
filed the two charges on separate days. Ironically, if the two 
charges had been filed in the same charging document or the 
defense lawyer, the prosecutor, the judge or the court 
administer had scheduled the two sentencings for the same 
day—Newhouse would not be a Career Offender.40 
Because of these weird facts, the judge analyzed the Career 
Offender Guideline in great detail and stated his policy 
disagreement with the Career Offender Guideline as applied to 
my facts and varied downward to my mandatory minimum 




pseudoephedrine from multiple stores—a process known in the 
methamphetamine trade as ‘smurfing.’”). 
 37. Id. at 958. 
 38. See id. at 957 (“Newhouse was charged in state court and pled guilty 
to possession with intent to deliver.”). 
 39. See id. at 957–58 (sentencing by Chief Judge Arthur Gamble of the 
Fifth Judicial District of Iowa). 
 40. Id. at 958. 
 41. See id. at 992 (reducing the sentence indicated under the Career 
Offender Guidelines by 54.2 percent to 63.3 percent). 
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I used the variance factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to 
determine the final sentence.42 I was especially concerned with 
the flip-side of unwarranted sentencing disparity:  unwarranted 
sentencing uniformity—a problem that I find is both as 
important as unwarranted sentencing disparity and so often 
overlooked in federal sentencing.43 
G. Jason Pepper 
Like Steven Spears’s, my sentencing by Judge Bennett went 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.44 My case is really complicated 
procedurally. There are four Eighth Circuit reported decisions 
referred to in my Supreme Court decision as Pepper I–Pepper 
IV.45 But cutting to the chase, my original federal sentencing 
guideline range on my meth case was 97 to 121 months.46 The 
judge departed down to a sentence of two years.47 In Pepper I, the 
Eighth Circuit decided the judge had considered an 
impermissible factor and reversed and ordered resentencing.48 I 
 
 42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (including nature and circumstances 
of offense, defendant’s criminal history, and the purpose and desired effect of 
the sentence on the offender). 
 43. See United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 977–79 (N.D. 
Iowa 2013) (noting that blindly applying sentencing uniformity to defendants 
who are convicted of similar crimes without considering the mitigating and 
aggravating factors of each case individually often results in sentencing 
disparity). 
 44. See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (“The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded in this case that the 
District Court, when resentencing petitioner after his initial sentence had 
been set aside on appeal, could not consider evidence of petitioner’s 
rehabilitation since his initial sentencing.”). 
 45. See id. at 482–86 (noting that the 8th Circuit decided Pepper I in 2005, 
Pepper II in 2007, Pepper III in 2008, and Pepper IV in 2009). 
 46. See United States v. Pepper, 412 F. 3d 995, 996 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that the government filed a motion to have the range reduced given Pepper’s 
informing on two other individuals involved with illegal drugs and weapons). 
 47. See id. at 997 (granting the government’s motion). 
 48. See id. at 999 (“[N]amely [the district court’s] desire to sentence Mr. 
Pepper to the shortest possible term of imprisonment that would allow him to 
participate in the intensive drug treatment program at the federal prison in 
Yankton.”). 
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was released from federal prison just three days after the 
decision in Pepper I.49 At the resentencing hearing before Judge 
Bennett, I offered considerable testimony about my 
rehabilitation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, this evidence 
included that I had successfully completed the 500-hour drug 
treatment program while in federal prison, that after my release 
I enrolled as a full-time student in a community college and 
earned straight A’s, that I obtained part-time employment a few 
weeks after my release from prison and that I have maintained 
this employment, and that I was in compliance with all my 
conditions of supervised released.50 My father also testified that 
while he had no contact with me for five years prior to me going 
to prison that he had re-established a relationship with me 
because the drug treatment program in prison “sobered me up” 
and made my way “of thinking change” and that I was “much 
more mature” and “serious in terms of planning for the future.”51 
Finally, my U.S. probation officer testified that a sentence of 
twenty-four months was reasonable and that I was at a low risk 
of re-offending and also prepared a sentencing memo with 
further reasons supporting the twenty-four month sentence.52 
Based on this evidence, Judge Bennett again gave me a 
sentence of twenty-four months, based in large part on my 
post-sentencing rehabilitation.53 The government again 
appealed, and the Eighth Circuit again reversed, holding that 
 
 49. See Pepper, 562 U.S. at 482 (beginning supervised release 
immediately after). 
 50. See id. at 482 
[M]y life was basically headed to either where—I guess where I 
ended up, in prison, or death. Now I have some optimism about my 
life, about what I can do with my life. I’m glad that I got this chance 
to try again I guess you could say at a decent life . . . My life was 
going nowhere before, and I think that it’s going somewhere now. 
 51. See id. at 482–83 (“[A]nd that as a consequence, he had reestablished 
a relationship with his son.”) (citations omitted). 
 52. See id. at 483 (noting also that Pepper’s substantial assistance to law 
enforcement was of great import). 
 53. See id. (“[C]oncluding that ‘it would [not] advance any purpose of 
federal sentencing policy or any other policy behind the federal sentencing 
guidelines to send this defendant back to prison.’”). 
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post-sentencing rehabilitation was “an impermissible factor to 
consider in granting a downward variance.”54 After my first 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and another reversal of the 
Eighth Circuit, my second appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court 
resulted in the landmark holding that post-sentencing 
rehabilitation may, in appropriate cases like mine, support a 




On his final resentencing, Jason Pepper was sentenced to 
time served by another judge in our district after I stated on the 
record in my last resentencing of Mr. Pepper that my oath of 
office did not allow me to give a greater sentence than the 
twenty-four months.56 
H. Willie Hayes 
I was a low level, non-violent addict meth dealer sentenced 
by Judge Bennett. My lawyer pointed out in a sentencing 
memorandum that the meth guidelines had increased from their 
original range of 46 to 57 months—had I been sentenced back in 
1987 when the guidelines were first promulgated—to 168 to 210 
months, a staggering 360 percent increase.57 My lawyer argued 
that the drug guidelines should be given less deference than other 
 
 54. See id. (affirming the downward departure for the defendant’s 
substantial assistance but rejecting the additional downward departure for his 
post-sentencing rehabilitation). 
 55. Cf. id. at 504 (highlighting U.S. Supreme Court precedent that 
allowed for increases in sentencing based on the offenders conduct 
immediately following his or her original sentencing). 
 56. See THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON, SIGMUND G. POPKO, DEBORAH YOUNG, 
MICHAEL P. O’CONNOR & CELIA M. RUMANN, FED. SENT’G L. & PRAC., § 11.9.3 
n.22 (2020 ed.) (stating that Pepper’s time-served sentence on remand was 
reported in a legal blog from the Iowa Public Defender Office). 
 57. See United States v. Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1012 (N.D. Iowa 
2013) (arguing that the Sentencing Commission strayed from its institutional 
role and drafted a particular guideline that failed to promote the sentencing 
goals of the Fair Sentencing Act). 
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guidelines because they were not crafted based on empirical 
evidence or the institutional expertise of the United States 
Sentencing Commission.58 After a lengthy discussion of the meth 
guideline, the judge noted the guideline was “deeply flawed” and 
that he had a strong policy disagreement with it.59 He decided 
the remedy was to slash the meth guideline by one third in my 
case and all future meth cases.60 
 
 
I wrote that the “Guidelines were intended to be 
evolutionary in nature, and policy disagreements provide a 
valuable function in the process of constantly improving 
them.”61 After lawyers seized on my Hayes decision and argued 
it even for high-level major drug sellers, including violent ones 
who were not addicts but sold drugs for greed, I limited it for the 
most part to low-level, non-violent drug addicts. These were the 
vast majority of drug offenders I sentenced. 
I. Brandon Beiermann 
Perhaps I am near to last in this Article because my crime is 
often considered one of the most reprehensible by the public and 
the criminal justice system, both the folks who work in the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, and other inmates. As Judge Bennett 
noted in his opinion, I was the first Eagle Scout he sentenced, 
and I had no prior criminal record.62 I was charged with and 
 
 58. See id. (“Hayes asserts that the methamphetamine Guidelines fail to 
promote the goals of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because they have a 
strong potential to overstate the seriousness of a defendant’s record and risk 
of reoffending, resulting in unwarranted sentencing disparities.”). 
 59. See id. at 1031–33 (applying a three-step 8th Circuit methodology for 
recalculating sentencing ranges in light of conflicts with public policy). 
 60. See id. at 1031 (“[A]fter reducing the Guidelines range by one third to 
account for my policy disagreement, I will reserve the ability to adjust the 
figure upwards and downwards as I weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”). 
 61. Id. at 1031. 
 62. See United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1090 (N.D. 
Iowa 2009) (“This case raises the question of the merits of the advisory United 
States Sentencing Guideline for defendants convicted of child pornography 
offenses . . . .”). 
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convicted of three counts of possessing, receiving, and sending on 
my computer to others images of child pornography.63 
I had graduated from high school and was happily married 
with two children. I had been sexually abused by a relative when 
I was six and seven years old. I was never involved in “hands-on” 
impermissibly touching a child or teenager. I lived in a small 
town and considered myself to be a loner. Judge Bennett insisted 
that before he could sentence me, he wanted an expert 
psychologist to evaluate me for purposes of testifying at trial, 
including a risk assessment of the likelihood of further sex 
crimes.64 
The expert psychologist testified in my contested sentencing 
hearing based on his own evaluation and a prior one that I had 
from Catholic Charities. The expert testified that I did not pose 
a serious risk of sexual violence but would benefit from 
participation in a sex offender treatment program.65 
My advisory federal sentencing guideline range was 210 to 
262 months. As the judge wrote in his opinion, this guideline 
range substantially exceeded both the mandatory minimum of 
sixty months and, at the top of the range, exceeded even the 
statutory maximum, which would be illegal for a judge to 
impose.66 The judge even pointed out that the maximum possible 
sentence on count 3, ten years’ incarceration, was irrationally 
and grossly exceeded by the guideline range of 210 to 262.67 Of 
course, I could not be sentenced above a statutory maximum on 
 
 63. See id. at 1091 (charging for conduct that occurred between 
September of 2005 through January 11, 2006). 
 64. See id. at 1091–94 (disallowing the prosecutor from interviewing or 
even speaking with the psychologist prior to sentencing or calling the expert 
as a witness during the sentencing hearing). 
 65. See id. at 1094 (“[H]is understanding of his offense is limited and his 
social skills are such that he is likely to benefit from referral to such a 
program.”). 
 66. See id. at 1098 (violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1)–(2)). 
 67. See id. at 1097 (indicating that this range was calculated after 
accounting for aggravating and mitigating factors). 
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any count. My statutory maximum on counts 1 and 2 was twenty 
years, somewhere in the middle of my sentencing range.68 
Judge Bennett joined an increasing cadre of federal 
sentencing judges who had strong policy disagreements with the 
harshness of the guidelines.69 His opinion discusses the myriad 
of factors that judges should consider in cases like mine:  whether 
the guideline is based on empirical research or evidence, the 
degree of deference to give this advisory guideline, the extensive 
reasons for the judge’s categorical rejection on policy grounds of 
the guideline, the consideration of all the § 3553(a) sentencing 
factors as well as the parsimony clause of § 3553.70 After 
factoring in all this information, Judge Bennett imposed a 
sentence of ninety months followed by ten years of supervised 
release with many restrictive conditions of supervised release.71 
 
 
Beiermann was one of the early child porn offenders I 
sentenced. Towards the end of my judicial career of populating 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, I would have substantially 
reduced Beiermann to closer to, if not at, the sixty-month 
mandatory minimum but increased his term of supervised 
release. This would have reduced the harshness of his sentence 
yet given the criminal justice system many years to ensure 
Beirmann did not reoffend—and if he did, then treat him more 
harshly by invocating progressive discipline. Much empirical 
work needs to be done to verify if progressive discipline is truly 
evidence based and if there is a better approach to repeat 
offenders on supervised release. 
 
 68. See id. at 1098 (falling between the prescribed range of 17.5 years and 
21.8 years). 
 69. See id. at 1100 (citing federal district courts in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin). 
 70. See id. at 1097–117 (including the need to avoid sentencing 
disparities and to provide restitution to victims). 
 71. See id. at 1117 (basing the sentence on limited precedent and the 
avoidance of both unwanted sentencing disparities and inapplicable 
sentencing similarities). 
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J. Hector Rodriguez 
I am Hector Rodriguez. In 2014, after serving forty-eight 
months in federal prison I ran into my sentencing judge, Judge 
Mark W. Bennett, at a local Walmart in Sioux City, Iowa, on a 
busy Saturday afternoon. When I saw him in an aisle, I ran up 
to him and asked if he was Judge Bennett. He said “Yes,” and I 
introduced myself as a person he had sentenced and reached out 
my hand to shake his. He warmly shook my hand with both his 
hands and asked, “Hector, what did I sentence you for and for 
how long, and how long have you been out?” I responded:  “You 
gave me forty-eight months for a drug conspiracy case, but the 
prosecutors had asked for 150 months. I have been out for four 
years and successfully completed my thirty-six months of 
supervised release without a problem.” Judge Bennett 
congratulated me on my success. I told him,  
It meant a lot to me when you came and visited me in federal 
prison to see how I was doing and actually sat next to me 
during the noon meal and asked all about my family. At the 
time I was shocked to see you. After you left, I knew I was not 
going to disappoint you when I got out. Judge Bennett, my 
wife and two daughters are in the aisle looking at pots and 
pans, would you wait here while I get them, I would love for 
them to meet you? 
Judge Bennett said, “I would be honored to meet your 
family, Hector.” He then met my family and gave my wife and 
daughters big hugs and told them how important their support 
for me was in my rehabilitation and my becoming a productive 
member of society. He also told them how “proud he was of me 
and that my family and I should hang our heads high because I 
had not only paid my debt to society but was now a very 
productive and important member of society.” We all parted ways 
with tears of joy in our eyes. When Judge Bennett had sentenced 
me years earlier I was stunned when at the end of the sentencing, 
he came off the bench, walked over to where I had been sitting 
next to my defense counsel, and shook my hand. I was in leg and 
arm irons, so it was difficult but he did shake my hand. He said 
in a soft voice:  “Hector, you are a good man, father, and 
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husband, who made some very bad choices. I hope you will take 
advantage of the educational and work skills classes in prison 
and become the productive member of society that your family 
and I hope you can be.” He then turned to walk back to his 
chambers. My defense lawyer told me that he forgot to tell me 
Judge Bennett usually does this. He wants to say something 
positive as the last person in the free world I would see for many 
years, my lawyer explained. It was something about the judge’s 
humanity I will never forget. 
 
 
One of the most fulfilling parts of my federal judgeship, 
especially in a small town of 85,000 was the fact that I 
frequently ran into offenders I had sentenced and/or members 
of their families. They were most always extremely polite. 
Often, when I ran into family members of an offender who was 
still incarcerated, they had questions about the sentence, even 
if they had been at the sentencing. I greatly enjoyed the 
opportunity to arrange a meeting with them in my chambers or 
at a coffee house, donut shop, etc., to go over in detail the 
presentence report and my statement of reason for the sentence 
I gave. I answered all their questions, and they left with a much 
greater understanding of the harshness of federal sentencing 
when my hands were tied by the prior mandatory nature of the 
guidelines and the bone-crushing mandatory minimum 
sentences, even after the guidelines became advisory. As a 
public servant I viewed this as an important part of increasing 
public confidence in both the federal judiciary and the criminal 
justice system. If I sensed an interest, I also discussed with them 
actions they could take to help with criminal justice reform. 
III. Conclusion 
I have previously written that federal judges are addicted 
to lengthy incarceration.72 There are many reasons for this. 
That needs to change. If I were anointed King of Federal 
 
 72. See Bennett, Addicted to Incarceration, supra note 2, at 4 (resulting 
in overcrowded federal prisons). 
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Sentencing for a Day, my first act would be to slash the existing 
federal sentencing guideline ranges by fifty percent or some 
other percentage a Commission—made up of progressive judges 
and experts on penology—would suggest. I suggest a fifty 
percent reduction because no one disputes that the original U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, when reviewing 10,000 pre-sentence 
reports to calculate the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, ignored all 
cases where offenders received probation, which accounted for 
nearly fifty percent of the sentences across all case types 
reviewed.73 
My second reform as king would be to abolish all mandatory 
minimums in drug cases and most other criminal cases. Federal 
judges know when an offender deserves a very long sentence, 
usually to protect the public from that offender.  
Another recommendation I have is to strongly encourage 
federal judges to meet with offenders they have sentenced. 
Judge Stephen R. Bough from the Western District of Missouri 
has written an exceptionally powerful piece, Getting to Know a 
Felon.74 Every federal judge and any academics or students 
interested in criminal justice reform should read Judge Bough’s 
article. Truly getting proximate with offenders I had sentenced 
by visiting them in their prisons had more impact on my 
sentencing philosophy than all of the many thousands of 
Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and district court sentencing 
decisions and scholarly articles I have read. 
Both the United States Sentencing Commission and 
Congress should have many sessions with both current and 
former federal offenders to brainstorm about criminal justice 
reforms. 
Finally, both the United States Sentencing Commission 
and Congress should invite the leading criminal justice scholars 
and experts, especially those who have worked with exciting 
criminal justice reforms in the states and done empirical studies 
 
 73. See id. at 17–20 (stating that the Commission gave no reason for why 
it excluded probation sentences from its calculations). 
 74. See Stephen R. Bough, Getting to Know a Felon, 87 UMKC L. REV. 25, 
26–29 (2018) (using vignettes to illuminate the benefits of federal judges’ 
learning the stories of convicted felons). 
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to see what evidence-based practices the federal criminal justice 
system should adopt.  
No article on federal sentencing reform should be published 
without thanking the incredibly talented and diligent U.S. 
probation officers who advise U.S. magistrate judges on pretrial 
release or detention, supervise defendants on pretrial release, 
draft amazingly thorough and comprehensive presentence 
reports for district judges, and supervise offenders on release 
after their prison terms expire. Federal probation officers are 
the true unsung heroes of the federal criminal justice system. 
My reform efforts would not have been possible without their 
many discussions with me about the fairness of federal 
sentencing. 
